• Acquisition through innovation tournaments in high-tech industries: A comparative perspective

      Kleer, Robin; Wagner, Marcus (Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 2013)
      Acquisition of innovative firms is a widely observed phenomenon in high-tech industries. On the basis of distinct advantages of large and small firms, in this paper, we build a tournament model with possible acquisition activity of large firms to derive hypotheses on interdependencies between acquisition frequency and post-acquisition success rates. We find empirical support for our hypotheses that (1) acquisitions increase overall innovation output and (2) that the number of acquisitions is higher in industries with larger heterogeneity between established firms and young start-ups. However, our third hypothesis derived from the formal model that innovation success following from acquisitions varies across industries is only partially confirmed.
    • Acquisitions in a patent contest model with large and small firms

      Kleer, Robin (Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2009)
      Big companies and small innovation factories possess different advantages in a patent contest. While large firms typically have better access to product markets, small firms often have a superior R&D efficiency. These distinct advantages immediately lead to the question of cooperations between firms. In this paper, we model a patent contest with heterogeneous firms. In a pre-contest acquisition game large firms bid sequentially for small firms to combine respective advantages. Sequential bidding allows the first large firms to bid strategically to induce a reaction of its competitor. For high efficiencies both large firms prefer to acquire immediately leading to a symmetric market structure. For low efficiencies strategic waiting of the first large firm leads to an asymmetric market structure even though the initial situation is symmetric. We also discuss two different timing setups of the acquisition stage. In all setups, acquisitions increase the chances for a successful innovation.
    • Acquisitions: a curse or blessing for direct competitors? The impact of target ownership structure  

      Mataigne, Virginie; Luypaert, Mathieu; Manigart, Sophie (Journal of Corporate Finance, 2021)
      This study examines the impact of horizontal acquisition announcements on the value of direct competitors of the combined entity. We argue that the ownership structure of the target drives competitor wealth effects. First, the stronger disciplining force of the market for corporate control for public firms compared to private firms will lead to higher competitive pressure post-acquisition when a public firm is acquired, leading to more negative valuation effects of direct competitors. Second, acquisitions of subsidiary targets, compared to stand-alone targets, are expected to lead to stronger asset utilization improvements in the target, leading to more negative competitor returns. A unique hand-collected sample of 1,038 direct competitors of 228 horizontal acquisitions in Europe empirically supports these hypotheses. Alternative explanations, such as information asymmetry or empire-building, are rejected.
    • The interplay between target firm R&D, acquirer debt financing and takeover premia

      Mataigne, Virginie; De Maeseneire, Wouter; Luypaert, Mathieu (Applied Economics Letters, 2018)
      The level of acquisition premia is of paramount importance in light of the vast sums paid to target shareholders and the often disappointing returns realized by corporate buyers. In this letter, we focus on the impact of R&D investments by targets on the acquisition premium contingent upon the acquirer's financing choices. Based on a unique hand-collected sample of 407 listed European transactions, we find a positive effect of target R&D on premia paid. Yet, when acquirers finance the acquisition of an R&D intensive target with debt, the positive relation disappears. Consequently, we establish that financing sources affect bidding strategies of acquiring companies in case of difficult-to-value targets.