Building on the e-Satisfaction model proposed by Szymanski and Hise (2000) and further validated by Evanschitzky, Iyer, Hesse, and Ahlert (2004), we develop an instrument to measure shopper satisfaction in online and offline retail contexts: the (R)E-Tail Satisfaction scale. Using data from an online (N=202) and an offline (N=441) grocery shopper sample, the instrument is shown to be fit for cross-channel evaluation of levels of satisfaction and its antecedents. We find full metric invariance (identical factor loadings), sufficient partial scalar invariance (identical item intercepts for at least two items per construct), as well as some interesting structural differences. Most notably, online shoppers evaluate the facets of retail satisfaction generally lower than do offline shoppers.

Raising public awareness and trust in transmission infrastructure development is one of the key current challenges facing Transmission System Operators (TSOs) and other project developers. The result can be costly delays. Fine-tuning the regulatory toolbox that National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) apply to incentivise TSOs can be part of the solution. The toolbox consists of cost-plus or rate of return regulation, price or revenue cap regulation, and output regulation. Each of these tools has strengths and limitations in terms of biases. In this brief, we identify the biases that are specific to stakeholder engagement activities that TSOs undertake to increase the public awareness and trust. Under the cost-plus approach, NRAs are biased towards the least controversial activity. Thus, the TSOs will try to anticipate the costs that will be more easily approved by the regulator. However, these least controversial activities may not be the most effective. Under the price/revenue cap, TSOs can be biased towards prioritising activities that result in the highest direct improvement of cost efficiency. They can also be biased in selecting the least controversial activities rather than the most cost-effective ones, simply because it can adversely affect their reputation and their engagement with the regulator. Under output regulation, independent experts can help the regulator to assess and challenge the stakeholder engagement activities undertaken by a TSO. This approach, however, requires a higher level of sophistication and complexity so that it can only be managed properly by a regulatory agency with sufficient resources and skills.

In this article, we empirically investigate the industry determinants of value creation through Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) and the division of M&A gains for a sample of horizontal acquisitions in Europe during the period 1997–2008. We calculate the combined abnormal return around deal announcement to proxy for M&A value creation. Our results show that industry sales concentration and the ratio of the combined target and bidder size relative to the minimum efficient scale in the corresponding industry are significantly negatively associated with M&A value creation. The relation between industry sales growth and M&A gains is U-shaped. The extent of foreign competition within the industry, industry technological intensity and industry deregulation bear no significant association with M&A wealth effects, however. Finally, the data reveal that the division of M&A gains between target and bidder investors is determined by firm and deal characteristics rather than by industry conditions.