• When your supervisor underperforms: the role of process feedback and the formality of feedback

      Stouthuysen, Kristof; Slabbinck, Hendrik; Distelmans, Tineke (2021)
      This study investigates the role of process feedback as a mechanism to motivate employees after a period of underperformance. We examine whether process feedback, following negative outcome feedback has a positive influence on employees’ willingness to improve performance, and whether this effect differs across organizational roles and the nature of the feedback provided. Based on an experiment and field survey, we find evidence that process feedback encourages employees to improve future performance and this effect becomes further pronounced for employees in a non-supervisory role. For supervisors, though, we find that the relationship between process feedback and future performance improvements is crucially dependent on the formality of feedback. Specifically, underperforming supervisors are more likely to positively react to process feedback when the feedback is generated in a formal way (e.g., by a formalized information system) while the opposite holds for underperforming non-supervisory employees. We also provide evidence that this interaction effect is mediated by feedback acceptance.
    • Where does business research go from here? Food-for-thought on academic papers in business research

      Geuens, Maggie (Journal of Business Research, 2011)
      The author reports the results of a survey on global compensation management practices in multinational firms, most of them headquartered in continental Europe and the United Kingdom. The study focuses on whether decisions on different compensation and benefits issues in these firms are taken at a headquarters or at the regional, business unit or country/local level. In addition, the author provides more qualitative information on the degree to which the respondents are satisfied with the decision-making process as well as their concrete suggestions for improvement. Finally, the author deals with the question of whether centralization or decentralization is the preferable option.
    • Where's the customer in technology-based radical innovation?

      Vercauteren, Anne; Vanhaverbeke, Wim (International Journal of Technology Marketing, 2007)
    • Which tangible and intangible assets matter for innovation speed in start-ups?

      Heirman, Ans; Clarysse, Bart (Journal of Product Innovation Management, 2007)
    • Who am I and if yes, how many?' Notes on the myth of leadership authenticity

      Wetzel, Ralf (TAMARA. Journal for Critical Organization Inquiry, 2015)
      Authentic leadership appears as the solution to plenty of painful contemporary problems. Bad economy, bad organizational performance, bad culture would all become subject to change for the better if leaders behave more authentically, according to the line of discussion. However, the debate seems to stand on poor feet, since some core assumptions don't stand a closer viability check. This paper highlights two core problems in the foundations of the authenticity debate such as the belief in a stable core self and the trust in a homogenous organization. The paper demonstrates not only the fragmented and narrative constitution of self and organization, we show furthermore to which hidden problem the authenticity debate refers, to which the sheer existence of the debate is already a solution. It is complexity avoidance that the authenticity debate provides. It helps to re-install the myth of the influential leader in a situation, in which the opposite has become apparent.
    • Who drives the change? Revisiting the CEO's strategic commitment

      Behr, Henning; Fehre, Kerstin (Academy of Management Proceedings, 2014)
      The Upper Echelons Theory has been proved to play an important role in strategic management research. Former studies have shown significant effects of CEO-specific demographic data on a firm's strategic outcome. For a further validation of those results, we reevaluate the existing results based on the concept of the commitment to the status quo (CSQ) on a German sample. Furthermore, we extend past research and investigate the impact of selected characteristics of CEO turnovers on CEOs' strategic commitment. We find evidence that supports existing findings about antecedents of CSQ, i.e. CEO tenure and past performance are good determinants for CEO's CSQ. Contrariwise, the influence of other factors like firm size or slack resources has to be reconsidered in international context. Our results further suggest that especially newly appointed CEOs after a forced turnover have the lowest commitment to current strategies and therefore the largest potential to overcome organizational inertia.
    • Who gets private equity? The role of debt capacity, growth and intangible assets

      Baeyens, Katleen; Manigart, Sophie (2006)
      While informed private equity (PE) investors screen for the most promising ventures, firms may avoid raising of PE for issues of cost and control. A critical question therefore is: which firms get PE? We consider both supply and demande side arguments to study the characteristics of a sample of 231 firms that did receive PE and compare them to those of a matched sample. Supporting the pecking order theory, we show that firms rely on PE funding when there are no alternatives, i.e.when their debt capacity is limited, due to financial and bankruptcy risk and due to important investments in intangibles. PE investors, from their side, select firms with substantial growth options. Further, firms that receive PE have grown more before the funding event than companies that did not receive PE. Keywords: financing choice, private equity JEL classification: G32
    • Who gets venture capital?

      Baeyens, Katleen; Manigart, Sophie (2006)
    • Who is in charge of digital transformation? The birth and rise of the chief digital officer

      Buchwald, Arne; Lorenz, Felix (2020)
      With the increasing pressure for organizations to digitalize, many companies are complementing their top management teams (TMT) with new members, chief informational and digital officers (CIOs and CDOs). As members of top management teams, CIOs and CDOs are expected to fulfill essential roles in the digital transformation strategy and its implementation. By making decisions on digitalization, they also influence business model development, innovation, and business strategy. While research on digital transformation is growing steadily, we lack a coherent understanding of the extent and nature of these top management roles and their relationships and the specific tasks involved. Based on the literature on management, information systems, and related fields, this paper discusses the evolving CIO and CDO roles and their interrelationships. Our key contribution is to conceptualize the role split, the emergence of the CDO, the nature of organizational roles and relationships by drawing on concepts of organizational ambidexterity, transactive memory systems (TMS), and shared understanding. We find that despite the separation of roles and potentially overlapping responsibilities, a collaborative relationship can be beneficial due to the complementary nature of the roles particularly to drive the digital transformation. We conclude with a future research agenda."
    • Who is Who?

      De Maeseneire, Wouter; De Meyer, Martijn (2015)
    • Who said that looks do not matter? The effects of rating scales on response styles.

      Cabooter, Elke; Weijters, Bert; Geuens, Maggie; Vermeir, Iris (2010)
    • Who will lead the energy market in 2030?

      Momber, Ilan; Tackx, Koen; Hadush, Samson Yemane; Meeus, Leonardo (2015)
      There are many uncertainties that might determine the future of the energy industry in general and the landscape of network operation in particular. According to the Vlerick Energy Centre together with a team of European industry leaders two of these uncertainties call for deeper analysis as they are more relevant and most likely game changers for the power grid industry: consumer involvement and decentralised generation. Depending on the level of consumer involvement in energy choices and the amount of decentralisation of the energy resources four scenarios were developed on how the energy market in Europe could look like in 2030. The co-creation process was supervised by Prof Paul Schoemaker, the world-leading scenario-planning expert from Wharton School.
    • Why (and how) to regulate power exchanges in the EU market integration context

      Meeus, Leonardo (Energy Policy, 2011)
      The European Union (EU) market integration is leading to increasingly monopolistic electricity market infrastructures, which has opened a debate on the regulation of these so-called power exchanges. In this paper, we start by stating that there are two types of power exchanges in Europe, i.e. “merchant” and “cost-of-service regulated” power exchanges. We then discuss how regulation can be used to better align their incentives with the main power exchange tasks. We conclude that adopting the cost-of-service regulated model for all power exchanges in Europe could be counterproductive in the current context, but that regulation can help ensure that the benefits of the EU market integration materialize. Promising regulatory actions include tempering the reinforced market power of power exchanges, and quality-of-service regulation for the ongoing cooperation among power exchanges to organize trade across borders. Research highlights ► Market integration is leading to increasingly monopolistic electricity market infrastructures. ► Regulation can help tempering the market power of these so-called power exchanges in Europe. ► Cost-of-service regulation for all power exchanges could however be counterproductive. ► More promising is to subject cooperation among power exchanges to quality of service regulation.
    • Why (and how) to regulate Power Exchanges in the EU market integration context?

      Meeus, Leonardo (2010)
      Power Exchanges (PXs) are key market institutions in open and market-based electricity industries. This paper aims at contributing to the ongoing debate on why and how to regulate Power Exchanges in the EU market integration context. The paper starts by stating that two different types of PXs have to be distinguished, i.e. “Merchant” PXs and the “Cost of Service Regulated” PXs. The paper continues by comparing the typical incentives of these two types of PXs to perform the basic PX tasks in an isolated national market and in a market integration context. The paper concludes by deriving from this analytical frame the most relevant regulatory actions.