The price set in electricity markets is given by the intersection of supply and demand during a given time period. The demand-side has traditionally been a price taker while the supply-side actively adjusts the output of the market clearing unit to fluctuations in consumption. Currently, there is a transition toward active demand participation that can adequately respond to market conditions. However, private knowledge of demand adjustments, such as the impact of modifying behavior or the availability to do so, creates asymmetry of information between the active supply side and the passive demand. This paper proposes a revelation mechanism that will prompt the demand-side to choose the best option for themselves among a menu of incentives. Rational behavior of consumers implies that demand will only shift when the benefit of doing so is higher than the costs of modifying consumption patterns. Given differences among demand participants and the objectives of the market operator, an analysis of the rationale of each market agent shows the feasible options for demand incentives. This study enables the design of appropriate market mechanisms aimed to discover customer categories and determine the adequate incentives for each case.

An efficient cross-border investment and well-designed markets and regulatory instruments are crucial prerequisites to the creation of a fully functional European internal electricity market. One of the prominent regulatory measures taken to speed up the creation of the internal market was to abolish tariff pancaking by replacing cross-border tariffs with an Inter-Transmission System Operators Compensation (ITC) mechanism through which transmission system operators (TSOs) can compensate each other. In this study, the implication of introducing such mechanism on the cross-border investment outcome is explored. The results indicate that the current ITC mechanism is loosely linked to the cross-border investment decisions of TSOs. In addition, the study concludes that factors such as the ITC fund size and the number of participating TSOs can influence the investment outcome.