In this paper we use corporate syndicated loan data to study the presence of a bank risk-taking channel of unconventional monetary policy in the United States over the period 2008-2015. To account for both actual policy decisions and anticipation effects, we measure the stance of monetary policy by estimating a financial VAR model. We find that accommodative monetary conditions are associated with overall lower loan spreads. Controlling for borrower creditworthiness, we show that the spread reduction is lower for riskier firms, indicating that risk is appropriately priced during the period of unconventional monetary policy. Banks with low non-performing loan ratios and banks characterized by high revenue diversification offer larger loan spread discounts compared to banks with a large amount of non-performing loans and banks with less income diversification. We also find that banks with low capital ratios, less profitable banks and smaller banks more aggressively reduce the corporate loan spreads following an expansionary monetary policy shock, but only for the safest firms. Our findings indicate that unconventional monetary policy actions of the Federal Reserve are not associated with excessive risk taking by banks in the syndicated loan market.

Do banks worry about expropriation when an activist hedge fund targets their borrowers or are they reassured that their borrowers will perform better after such targeting? We study 1,435 events from 1996-2013 in which an activist targeted a US corporation to examine what happens to loan contract terms post-targeting. We find that banks charge a higher interest rate for loans made after the activist involvement compared to a matched sample of borrowers that were not targeted. However, we find that the initial stock price reaction to the announcement of an activist intervention is a strong predictor of post-target loan rates. Banks increase the loan rates for those targets that experience a strong positive stock price reaction. These findings suggest that banks adjust their loan pricing to reflect their concerns about wealth expropriation.

Do banks worry about expropriation when an activist hedge fund targets their borrowers or are they reassured that their borrowers will perform better after such targeting? We study 1,435 events from 1996-2013 in which an activist targeted a US corporation to examine what happens to loan contract terms post-targeting. We find that banks charge a higher interest rate for loans made after the activist involvement compared to a matched sample of borrowers that were not targeted. However, we find that the initial stock price reaction to the announcement of an activist intervention is a strong predictor of post-target loan rates. Banks increase the loan rates for those targets that experience a strong positive stock price reaction. These findings suggest that banks adjust their loan pricing to reflect their concerns about wealth expropriation.

Do banks worry about expropriation when an activist hedge fund targets their borrowers or are they reassured that their borrowers will perform better after such targeting? We study 1,435 events from 1996-2013 in which an activist targeted a US corporation to examine what happens to loan contract terms post-targeting. We find that banks charge a higher interest rate for loans made after the activist involvement compared to a matched sample of borrowers that were not targeted. However, we find that the initial stock price reaction to the announcement of an activist intervention is a strong predictor of post-target loan rates. Banks increase the loan rates for those targets that experience a strong positive stock price reaction. These findings suggest that banks adjust their loan pricing to reflect their concerns about wealth expropriation.