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Why do European venture capital companies syndicate?
Financial theory, resource-based theory and access to deal flow are used to explain syndication practices among European venture capital (VC) firms. The desire to share risk and increase portfolio diversification is a more important motive for syndication than the desire to access additional intangible resources or deal flow. Access to resources is, however, more important for non-lead than for lead investors. When resource-based motives are more important, the propensity to syndicate increases. Syndication intensity is higher for young VC firms and for VC firms, specialised in a specific investment stage. Finally, syndication strategies are similar across European countries, but differ from North American strategies.
De financiële toestand van de Belgische ondernemingen 2002
Dit boek en de bijhorende cd-rom geeft de gebruiker een overzicht in de evolutie van de financiële toestand van de Belgische ondernemingen per regio en per sector. De financiële situatie van de Belgische ondernemingen wordt besproken aan de hand van 10 sleutelratio's en 2 risico-indicatoren.
Case Basic Textiles
On 15 December 2007, Sammy Lasseel was facing an important decision that could change his life, but he had to act quickly. He joined Basic Textiles last year as CEO, with an option to buy the company within the year. The current shareholders have given him an ultimatum: Sammy had the opportunity to buy the company for 4 million euros, but he had to decide before Christmas. If he declined their proposal, he would be fired as CEO as from January 2008 onwards. Sammy first had to decide whether he was willing to pay 4 million euros for the shares. If so, how could he finance the takeover?
Venture capitalists in Asia: a comparison with the U.S. and Europe.
This research utilizes an institutional perspective to examine the behavior of venture capital professionals in three distinct regions of the world (Asia, U.S., Europe). Based upon a mail survey, we find reasonably consistent views around the world on the relative importance of various venture capitalist roles. However, we find that how those roles are implemented is shaped by cognitive institutional influences in the given region. We find that a model developed in the U.S. to predict the amount of venture capitalist/CEO interaction is not valid in Asia. Further, Asian boards have much greater insider representation than do U.S. or European boards. We attribute these difference to the greater emphasis in Asia on the importance of collective action.