• Collaborative shipping under different cost-sharing agreements

      Padilla Tinoco, Silvia Valeria; Creemers, Stefan; Boute, Robert (European Journal of Operational Research, 2017)
      We study collaborative shipping where two shippers bundle their shipments to share the same transportation vehicle (also known as co-loading). The goal of such a collaboration is to reduce the total number of transports, thereby reducing transportation costs and CO2emissions. To synchronize the replenishment of both companies, we adopt a can-order joint replenishment policy for both companies, and we analyze how the costs of each individual company are impacted by the collaboration. We consider different agreements to redistribute the costs (or the gains) of the collaboration, ranging from no cost redistribution at all, sharing the transportation costs (or its gains) only, to sharing the total logistics costs (or its gains) that are impacted by the collaboration, i.e., transportation + inventory costs. We show that the stability (and thus the long-term viability) of the partnership strongly depends on the cost-sharing agreement, in combination with the allocation mechanism used to share the costs (or gains) of the coordination. Although most companies focus on the redistribution of transportation costs, we show that this might not lead to a stable situation where each individual company eventually benefits from collaboration.
    • Collaborative Shipping Under Information Distortion

      Padilla Tinoco, Silvia Valeria; Spiliotopoulou, Eirini; Boute, Robert (Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, 2018)
      We examine the incentives for a firm to provide non-truthful demand information under a two-company shipping collaboration. We analyze how distorted demand reporting impacts the logistics costs of each individual company in the collaboration and how this impacts the stability of the collaboration agreement. We find that when the cost allocation proportions are agreed ex-ante based on the reported demand, companies have an incentive to deflate their demand when simple cost allocation rules are used; only when the Shapley value is in place, companies have no incentive to distort their demand information. When the cost allocation proportions are calculated ex-post, based on realized demand, the truth-telling strategy is dominant when the Shapley value or an allocation rule based on the demand or stand-alone costs is in place.