• Experience with electricity market test suite: students versus computational agents

      Trinh, Quynh Chi; Saguan, Marcelo; Meeus, Leonardo (IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2013)
      This paper applies two experimental economics methods (i.e., agent-based modeling and laboratory experiment) to a market test suite that is based on a fictional European wholesale electricity market. Quantitative results of generators' strategic behavior in this market context are separated between generators played by human subjects (i.e., master students) in a laboratory experiment and generators represented by computational agents in an agent-based model. The behavior is measured through offers that students or agents make when participating in the electricity trading auction and the market outcomes under both methods are discussed in order to illustrate the difference between the behavior of human and computational agents. The paper also identifies the improvements that would need to be made to the market test suite to allow for a more conclusive comparison in future experiments.
    • Impact of the regulatory framework for transmission investments on the cost of renewable energy in the EU.

      Saguan, Marcelo; Meeus, Leonardo (Energy Economics, 2014)
      Under the current regulatory frame in the EU, transmission planning is done at the national level to maximize national welfare, rather than European welfare. In this paper, we develop a competitive equilibrium model that calculates the impact of this imperfect regulatory framework on the cost of renewable energy. We apply the model to a power system with two interconnected zones, and find that the impact is case specific, but significant. We also find that the negative impact of national transmission planning on the cost of renewable energy is more significant in a state of the world in which Member States trade renewable energy, but that this negative effect is much smaller than the positive effect of renewable energy trade between Member States. We conclude that the imperfect regulatory framework for transmission investment is a significant cost for renewable energy in the EU, but that it should not stop Member States from trading renewable energy.
    • Innovating grid regulation to regulate grid innovation: from Orkney Isles to Kriegers Flak via Italy

      Meeus, Leonardo; Saguan, Marcelo (Renewable Energy, 2011)
      n the current context of a decarbonizing electricity system, grid innovation is needed to deal with the main challenges of integrating distributed generation, demand and storage, and large-scale renewable energy sources. Grid companies however have disincentives to innovate under the conventional regulatory framework, and if they do innovate, they are confronted with grid users that have disincentives to participate in the innovation. This paper analyzes three empirical cases where state of the art regulatory frameworks have been successful at stimulating grid innovation. The main lesson learned from the cases is that there is experience with addressing the disincentive of grid companies to innovate, but the participation of grid users in the innovation is much more an open issue
    • Well-functioning balancing markets: a prerequisite for wind power integration

      Vandezande, Leen; Meeus, Leonardo; Belmans, Ronnie; Saguan, Marcelo; Glachant, Jean-Michel (Energy Policy, 2010)
      This article focuses on the design of balancing markets in Europe taking into account an increasing wind power penetration. In several European countries, wind generation is so far not burdened with full balancing responsibility. However, the more wind power penetration, the less bearable for the system not to allocate balancing costs to the responsible parties. Given the variability and limited predictability of wind generation, full balancing exposure is however only feasible conditionally to well-functioning balancing markets. On that account, recommendations ensuring an optimal balancing market design are formulated and their impact on wind generation is assessed. Taking market-based or cost-reflective imbalance prices as the main objective, it is advised that: (1) the imbalance settlement should not contain penalties or power exchange prices, (2) capacity payments should be allocated to imbalanced BRPs via an additive component in the imbalance price and (3) a cap should be imposed on the amount of reserves. Efficient implementation of the proposed market design may require balancing markets being integrated across borders.