• Mobilizing cities towards a low-carbon future: Tambourines, carrots and sticks

      Azevedo, Isabel; Delarue, Erik; Meeus, Leonardo (2013)
      In the transition towards a low-carbon future in Europe, cities' actions are of major importance due to the prominence of urbanization, both in terms of population and in terms of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. As a result, we need city authorities to act, by using their competences as policy makers as well as energy users. However, cities are still not moving as fast as one might expect, indicating the need for additional incentives to prompt local action. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to present an overview of external incentives that might prompt cities to act and to highlight good practices that could be used in future initiatives. This paper first discusses how to evaluate the climate and energy performance of a city and how local authorities can contribute to its improvements. Moreover, it analyses the disincentives that local governments are confronted with, categorizing them as simple market failures, institutional failures and multi-agent failures. The paper then presents a survey of initiatives at national and EU levels to promote local action towards a low-carbon future; grouping them into tambourines, carrots and sticks. We focus on Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden because they are pioneering countries regarding energy policies for cities.
    • Offshore grids for renewables: do we need particular regulatory framework

      Meeus, Leonardo (2015)
      Onshore, generators are connected to the transmission grid by TSOs. This regulatory model could simply be extended to offshore (i.e. Germany), but the connection of offshore wind farms to shore is also an opportunity to test alternatives, i.e. the third party model (i.e. the UK) or the generator model (i.e. Sweden). In this paper, we argue that the third party and generator models are indeed better suited to support the evolution towards larger scale offshore wind farms that are increasingly developed farther out to sea, while the TSO model is better suited to support the evolution towards cross-border offshore grid projects. In other words, an important trade-off needs to be made because none of the existing regulatory models can fulfill all the expectations in the current context in Europe. And, the trade-off has to be made at the regional or EU level because the different national regulatory frameworks are incompatible when applied to a cross-border offshore grid project.
    • PEV storage in multibus scheduling problems

      Momber, Ilan; Morales-España, Germán; Ramos, Andrés; Gómez, Tómas (2014)
    • Regional electricity market integration - France - Belgium - Netherlands

      Meeus, Leonardo; Glachant, Jean-Michel; Belmans, Ronnie (2006)
    • Regulated cross-border transmission investment in Europe

      Meeus, Leonardo; Purchala, K.; Van Hertem, Dirk; Belmans, Ronnie (2006)
    • The implication of the European inter-TSO compensation mechanism for cross-border electricity transmission investments

      Hadush, Samson Yemane; De Jonghe, Cedric; Belmans, Ronnie (2015)
      An efficient cross-border investment and well-designed markets and regulatory instruments are crucial prerequisites to the creation of a fully functional European internal electricity market. One of the prominent regulatory measures taken to speed up the creation of the internal market was to abolish tariff pancaking by replacing cross-border tariffs with an Inter-Transmission System Operators Compensation (ITC) mechanism through which transmission system operators (TSOs) can compensate each other. In this study, the implication of introducing such mechanism on the cross-border investment outcome is explored. The results indicate that the current ITC mechanism is loosely linked to the cross-border investment decisions of TSOs. In addition, the study concludes that factors such as the ITC fund size and the number of participating TSOs can influence the investment outcome.
    • The regulatory experience of Italy and the United States with dedicated incentives for strategic electricity transmission investment

      Keyaerts, Nico; Meeus, Leonardo (Elsevier, 2017)
      There is a trend in regulatory practice towards providing dedicated incentives for strategic investments. Italy and the United States have the longest experience with authorizing returns and risk-mitigating incentives that deviate from standard regulatory treatment for policy purposes. In these countries, the regulatory incentives are based on a case-by-case assessment of capital projects. We find that the Italian scheme is simpler, which reduces administrative costs. The U.S. scheme is more advanced in the case-by-case assessment. Even though dedicated incentives may be controversial, our analysis of both experiences shows that, notwithstanding significant learning costs, both schemes have facilitated substantial financial investment in strategically important infrastructure.
    • Well-functioning balancing markets: a prerequisite for wind power integration

      Vandezande, Leen; Meeus, Leonardo; Belmans, Ronnie; Saguan, Marcelo; Glachant, Jean-Michel (2010)