• Least-cost distribution network tariff design in theory and practice

      Schittekatte, Tim; Meeus, Leonardo (The Energy Journal, 2020)
      In this paper a game-theoretical model with self-interest pursuing consumers is introduced in order to assess how to design a least-cost distribution tariff under two constraints that regulators typically face. The first constraint is related to difficulties regarding the implementation of cost-reflective tariffs. In practice, so-called cost-reflective tariffs are only a proxy for the actual cost driver(s) in distribution grids. The second constraint has to do with fairness. There is a fear that active consumers investing in distributed energy resources (DER) might benefit at the expense of passive consumers. We find that both constraints have a significant impact on the least-cost network tariff design, and the results depend on the state of the grid. If most of the grid investments still have to be made, passive and active consumers can both benefit from cost-reflective tariffs, while this is not the case for passive consumers if the costs are mostly sunk.
    • Market coupling and the importance of price coordination between power exchanges

      Meeus, Leonardo; Vandezande, Leen; Cole, S.; Belmans, Ronnie (Energy, 2009)
    • Mobilizing cities towards a low-carbon future: Tambourines, carrots and sticks

      Azevedo, Isabel; Delarue, Erik; Meeus, Leonardo (Energy Policy, 2013)
      In the transition towards a low-carbon future in Europe, cities' actions are of major importance due to the prominence of urbanization, both in terms of population and in terms of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. As a result, we need city authorities to act, by using their competences as policy makers as well as energy users. However, cities are still not moving as fast as one might expect, indicating the need for additional incentives to prompt local action. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to present an overview of external incentives that might prompt cities to act and to highlight good practices that could be used in future initiatives. This paper first discusses how to evaluate the climate and energy performance of a city and how local authorities can contribute to its improvements. Moreover, it analyses the disincentives that local governments are confronted with, categorizing them as simple market failures, institutional failures and multi-agent failures. The paper then presents a survey of initiatives at national and EU levels to promote local action towards a low-carbon future; grouping them into tambourines, carrots and sticks. We focus on Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden because they are pioneering countries regarding energy policies for cities.
    • Offshore grids for renewables: do we need particular regulatory framework

      Meeus, Leonardo (Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, 2015)
      Onshore, generators are connected to the transmission grid by TSOs. This regulatory model could simply be extended to offshore (i.e. Germany), but the connection of offshore wind farms to shore is also an opportunity to test alternatives, i.e. the third party model (i.e. the UK) or the generator model (i.e. Sweden). In this paper, we argue that the third party and generator models are indeed better suited to support the evolution towards larger scale offshore wind farms that are increasingly developed farther out to sea, while the TSO model is better suited to support the evolution towards cross-border offshore grid projects. In other words, an important trade-off needs to be made because none of the existing regulatory models can fulfill all the expectations in the current context in Europe. And, the trade-off has to be made at the regional or EU level because the different national regulatory frameworks are incompatible when applied to a cross-border offshore grid project.
    • PEV storage in multibus scheduling problems

      Momber, Ilan; Morales-España, Germán; Ramos, Andrés; Gómez, Tómas (IEEE Transactions on Smart Grids, 2014)
      Modeling electricity storage to address challenges and opportunities of its applications for smart grids requires inter-temporal equalities to keep track of energy content over time. Prevalently, these constraints present crucial modeling elements as to what extent energy storage applications can enhance future electric power systems' sustainability, reliability, and efficiency. This paper presents a novel and improved mixed-integer linear problem (MILP) formulation for energy storage of plug-in (hybrid) electric vehicles (PEVs) for reserves in power system models. It is based on insights from the field of System Dynamics, in which complex interactions between different elements are studied by means of feedback loops as well as stocks, flows and co-flows. Generalized to a multi-bus system, this formulation includes improvements in the energy balance and surpasses shortcomings in the way existing literature deals with reserve constraints. Tested on the IEEE 14-bus system with realistic PEV mobility patterns, the deterministic results show changes in the scheduling of the units, often referred to as unit commitment (UC).
    • Regional electricity market integration - France - Belgium - Netherlands

      Meeus, Leonardo; Glachant, Jean-Michel; Belmans, Ronnie (Revue-E, 2006)
    • Regulated cross-border transmission investment in Europe

      Meeus, Leonardo; Purchala, K.; Van Hertem, Dirk; Belmans, Ronnie (European Transactions on electrical power, 2006)
    • Regulatory framework and business models for charging PEVs: infrastructure, agents, and commercial relationships

      Gómez, Tómas; Momber, Ilan; Rivier, Michel; Sánchez-Miralles, á. (Energy Policy, 2011)
    • The implication of the European inter-TSO compensation mechanism for cross-border electricity transmission investments

      Hadush, Samson Yemane; De Jonghe, Cedric; Belmans, Ronnie (International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, 2015)
      An efficient cross-border investment and well-designed markets and regulatory instruments are crucial prerequisites to the creation of a fully functional European internal electricity market. One of the prominent regulatory measures taken to speed up the creation of the internal market was to abolish tariff pancaking by replacing cross-border tariffs with an Inter-Transmission System Operators Compensation (ITC) mechanism through which transmission system operators (TSOs) can compensate each other. In this study, the implication of introducing such mechanism on the cross-border investment outcome is explored. The results indicate that the current ITC mechanism is loosely linked to the cross-border investment decisions of TSOs. In addition, the study concludes that factors such as the ITC fund size and the number of participating TSOs can influence the investment outcome.
    • The next step in the Central Western European electricity market: cross-border balancing

      Vandezande, Leen; Meeus, Leonardo; Belmans, Ronnie (Revue-E, 2008)
    • The regulatory experience of Italy and the United States with dedicated incentives for strategic electricity transmission investment

      Keyaerts, Nico; Meeus, Leonardo (Utilities Policy, 2017)
      There is a trend in regulatory practice towards providing dedicated incentives for strategic investments. Italy and the United States have the longest experience with authorizing returns and risk-mitigating incentives that deviate from standard regulatory treatment for policy purposes. In these countries, the regulatory incentives are based on a case-by-case assessment of capital projects. We find that the Italian scheme is simpler, which reduces administrative costs. The U.S. scheme is more advanced in the case-by-case assessment. Even though dedicated incentives may be controversial, our analysis of both experiences shows that, notwithstanding significant learning costs, both schemes have facilitated substantial financial investment in strategically important infrastructure.
    • Towards an international tradable green certificate system - The challenging example of Belgium

      Verhaegen, K.; Meeus, Leonardo; Belmans, Ronnie (Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2009)
    • The welfare and price effects of sector coupling with power-to-gas

      Roach, Martin; Meeus, Leonardo (Energy Economics, 2020)
      Electricity markets with high installed capacities of Variable Renewable Energy Sources (VRES) experience periods of supply and demand mismatch, resulting in near-zero and even negative prices, or energy spilling due to surplus. The participation of emerging Power-to-X solutions in a sector coupling paradigm, such as Power-to-Gas (PTG), has been envisioned to provide a source of demand flexibility to the power sector and decarbonize the gas sector. We advance a long-run equilibrium model to study the PTG investment decision from the point of view of a perfectly competitive electricity and gas system where each sector's market is cleared separately but coupled by PTG. Under scenarios combining PTG technology costs and electricity RES targets, we study whether or not there is a convergence in the optimal deployment of PTG capacity and what is the welfare distribution across both sectors. We observe that PTG can play an important price-setting role in the electricity market, but PTG revenues from arbitrage opportunities erodes as more PTG capacity is installed. We find that the electricity and gas sector have aligned incentives to cooperate around PTG, and instead find an issue of misaligned incentives related to the PTG actor. Although not the focus of our analysis, in some scenarios we find that the welfare optimal PTG capacity results in a loss for the PTG actor, which reveals some intuition that subsidizing PTG can make sense to reduce the cost of RES subsidies. Sensitivity analyses are conducted to contextualize these findings for system specificities.
    • Well-functioning balancing markets: a prerequisite for wind power integration

      Vandezande, Leen; Meeus, Leonardo; Belmans, Ronnie; Saguan, Marcelo; Glachant, Jean-Michel (Energy Policy, 2010)