Modeling electricity storage to address challenges and opportunities of its applications for smart grids requires inter-temporal equalities to keep track of energy content over time. Prevalently, these constraints present crucial modeling elements as to what extent energy storage applications can enhance future electric power systems' sustainability, reliability, and efficiency. This paper presents a novel and improved mixed-integer linear problem (MILP) formulation for energy storage of plug-in (hybrid) electric vehicles (PEVs) for reserves in power system models. It is based on insights from the field of System Dynamics, in which complex interactions between different elements are studied by means of feedback loops as well as stocks, flows and co-flows. Generalized to a multi-bus system, this formulation includes improvements in the energy balance and surpasses shortcomings in the way existing literature deals with reserve constraints. Tested on the IEEE 14-bus system with realistic PEV mobility patterns, the deterministic results show changes in the scheduling of the units, often referred to as unit commitment (UC).
There is a trend in regulatory practice towards providing dedicated incentives for strategic investments. Italy and the United States have the longest experience with authorizing returns and risk-mitigating incentives that deviate from standard regulatory treatment for policy purposes. In these countries, the regulatory incentives are based on a case-by-case assessment of capital projects. We find that the Italian scheme is simpler, which reduces administrative costs. The U.S. scheme is more advanced in the case-by-case assessment. Even though dedicated incentives may be controversial, our analysis of both experiences shows that, notwithstanding significant learning costs, both schemes have facilitated substantial financial investment in strategically important infrastructure.
In the transition towards a low-carbon future in Europe, cities' actions are of major importance due to the prominence of urbanization, both in terms of population and in terms of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. As a result, we need city authorities to act, by using their competences as policy makers as well as energy users. However, cities are still not moving as fast as one might expect, indicating the need for additional incentives to prompt local action. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to present an overview of external incentives that might prompt cities to act and to highlight good practices that could be used in future initiatives.
This paper first discusses how to evaluate the climate and energy performance of a city and how local authorities can contribute to its improvements. Moreover, it analyses the disincentives that local governments are confronted with, categorizing them as simple market failures, institutional failures and multi-agent failures. The paper then presents a survey of initiatives at national and EU levels to promote local action towards a low-carbon future; grouping them into tambourines, carrots and sticks. We focus on Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden because they are pioneering countries regarding energy policies for cities.
Hadush, Samson Yemane; De Jonghe, Cedric; Belmans, Ronnie (2015)
An efficient cross-border investment and well-designed markets and regulatory instruments are crucial prerequisites to the creation of a fully functional European internal electricity market. One of the prominent regulatory measures taken to speed up the creation of the internal market was to abolish tariff pancaking by replacing cross-border tariffs with an Inter-Transmission System Operators Compensation (ITC) mechanism through which transmission system operators (TSOs) can compensate each other. In this study, the implication of introducing such mechanism on the cross-border investment outcome is explored. The results indicate that the current ITC mechanism is loosely linked to the cross-border investment decisions of TSOs. In addition, the study concludes that factors such as the ITC fund size and the number of participating TSOs can influence the investment outcome.
Traditional analysis of distribution network tariff design assumes a lack of alternatives to grid connection for the fulfilment of consumers' electricity needs. This is radically changing with breakthroughs in two technologies: (1) Photovoltaics (PV) enable domestic and commercial consumers to self-produce energy; (2) Batteries allow consumers and self-producers to gain control over their grid energy and capacity parameters. Contributing to the state of the art, the grid cost recovery problem for the Distribution System Operator (DSO) is modelled as a non-cooperative game between consumers. In this game, the availability and costs of the two named technologies strategically interact with tariff structures. Four states of the world for user's access to technologies are distinguished and three tariff structures are evaluated. The assessed distribution network tariff structures are: energy volumetric charges with net-metering, energy volumetric charges for both injection and withdrawal, and capacity-based charges. Results show that in a state of the world with new technology choices for grid users both efficiency and equity issues can arise when distribution network charges are ill-designed.
The role of DSOs is evolving due to the increasing penetration of intermittent and distributed energy resources in the distribution system. On the one hand, TSOs are accessing flexibility resources connected to the distribution grid. On the other hand, DSOs are actively managing distribution grid congestion, moving away from the conventional fit and forget approach. As a result, the need for DSO-TSO cooperation has become increasingly important. In this study, we first discuss market and grid operation issues related to different system states and the corresponding congestion management approaches, in the context of the European electricity market design and regulation. Second, we discuss viable solutions that are inspired by inter-TSO cooperation solutions as well as solutions that are being adopted by DSOs. Our findings show that the issues are rather similar both at transmission and distribution level; however, the need for cooperation and the solutions will depend on where structural congestion will occur and which borders will be managed. We also note that cooperation between DSOs as well as between DSOs and microgrids could become more important with the development of local energy markets in the long term.
Onshore, generators are connected to the transmission grid by TSOs. This regulatory model could simply be extended to offshore (i.e. Germany), but the connection of offshore wind farms to shore is also an opportunity to test alternatives, i.e. the third party model (i.e. the UK) or the generator model (i.e. Sweden). In this paper, we argue that the third party and generator models are indeed better suited to support the evolution towards larger scale offshore wind farms that are increasingly developed farther out to sea, while the TSO model is better suited to support the evolution towards cross-border offshore grid projects. In other words, an important trade-off needs to be made because none of the existing regulatory models can fulfill all the expectations in the current context in Europe. And, the trade-off has to be made at the regional or EU level because the different national regulatory frameworks are incompatible when applied to a cross-border offshore grid project.
Nowadays, the European electricity systems are evolving towards a generation mix that is more decentralised, less predictable and less flexible to operate. In this context, additional flexibility is expected to be provided by the demand side. Thus, how to engage consumers to participate in demand response is becoming a pressing issue. In this paper, we provide an analytical framework to assess consumers' potential and willingness to participate in active demand response from a contract perspective. On that basis, we present policy recommendations to empower and protect consumers in their shift to active demand response participants.
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