Mentioned in http://www.accountant.nl/Accountant/Leesvoer/Gespot/Februari+2009

Innovating firms often invest in a number of different technology projects, in different stages of development, using a wide range of distinct technology sourcing modes, such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, and mergers and acquisitions. Recently, firms have also gained an increasing awareness of the potential benefits of corporate venture capital investments. This paper investigates the particular role of corporate venture capital investments in the technology sourcing portfolio of firms. More specifically, we focus on the extent to which corporate venture capital investments are additive or complementary to other modes of technology sourcing when explaining the innovative performance of firms. The results indicate that corporate venture capital investments are particularly beneficial for the innovative performance of firms when they are used in combination with other technology sourcing modes.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, this study investigates which underlying determinants cause bank rating transitions. We develop survival analysis models to explain credit transition hazards using macroeconomic factors and the rating history. We find that there exists a significant dependence of rating upgrade or rating downgrade transition hazards on rating-specific covariates and macro-economic covariates. Our results confirm the momentum effect, meaning that a financial institution that has been recently upgraded/downgraded has a higher chance of being upgraded/downgraded again. The predictive performance of the developed models turns out to be satisfactory.

theories mentioned in research on executive compensation to each of these paradigms

More and more family firms open their capital for outside investors, yet existing studies mainly conclude that family firms are more reluctant than nonfamily firms to hand over control to outside investors. In this study, we build on an organizational identification perspective to explore why family firms differ in their attitudes toward outside investors. We hypothesize that family members who identify strongly with their firms are less willing to cede control to outside investors and, if they do cede control, have a stronger preference for investors who may readily identify with family firms, such as family offices or high net worth individuals, rather than investors who may not fit well with a familial identity, such as private equity sponsors or financial investors. We also hypothesize that social identification mediates the relationship between important family firm governance characteristics and preferences for outside investor. Exploratory evidence from a sample of Belgian family firms is supportive of most of our predictions.

and discusses the implications. The resulting synthesis provides new insights for