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dc.contributor.authorBalcaen, Sofie
dc.contributor.authorOoghe, Hubert
dc.contributor.authorManigart, Sophie
dc.date.accessioned2017-12-02T14:42:24Z
dc.date.available2017-12-02T14:42:24Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00191-010-0192-2
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12127/4228
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyses the duration of the time to exit of distressed firms, differentiating between court driven exits (mainly bankruptcies) and voluntary liquidations. It examines how long firms survive after initial signs of economic distress. The study is conducted on an extensive dataset of 5,233 Belgian distress-related exits of mature firms, the majority being privately held. The results highlight that slack resources have an opposite effect on the timing of court driven exits and voluntary liquidations. On the one hand, high levels of available and potential slack increase the time to court driven exit, as they allow distressed firms to postpone an impending court driven exit. On the other hand, high available slack resources shorten the time to voluntary liquidation, since they make voluntary liquidation easier. Further, a high level of stakeholder dependence increases the time to exit after distress, whether the firm exits through voluntary liquidation or through a court decided exit. This is explained by the fact that stakeholder dependence increases the complexity of the exit decision and the exit procedure.
dc.language.isoen
dc.subjectAccounting & Finance
dc.titleFrom distress to exit: Determinants of the time to exit
dc.identifier.journalJournal of Evolutionary Economics
dc.source.volume21
dc.source.issue3
dc.source.beginpage407
dc.source.endpage446
vlerick.knowledgedomainAccounting & Finance
vlerick.typearticleJournal article with impact factor
vlerick.vlerickdepartmentA&F
dc.identifier.vperid76600
dc.identifier.vperid35884
dc.identifier.vperid35891
dc.identifier.vpubid4885


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