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Publication type
Journal articleAuthor
Meeus, LeonardoPublication Year
2011Journal
Energy EconomicsPublication Volume
33Publication Issue
3Publication Begin page
413Publication End page
418
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Implicit auctioning in Europe is about eliminating cross-border trade inefficiencies by internalizing cross-border trade into the day-ahead auction procedures of the Power Exchanges that are already organizing trade nationally. On the Kontek Cable, implicit auctioning has first been implemented with "no coupling" between the relevant Power Exchanges, followed by a "volume coupling" implementation, and finally a "one way price coupling" implementation that is still operational today. The main contribution of this paper is to compare the theoretical properties of these three implementations and to analyze their performance empirically. We find that the third implementation is significantly outperforming the previous two implementations, but in this third implementation stakeholders partly abandoned the "volume coupling" approach they initially believed to be a viable alternative and institutionally easier to implementKeyword
Energy MarketsKnowledge Domain/Industry
Special Industries : Energyae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
10.1016/j.eneco.2010.10.008