Do banks worry about expropriation when an activist hedge fund targets their borrowers or are they reassured that their borrowers will perform better after such targeting? We study 1,435 events from 1996-2013 in which an activist targeted a US corporation to examine what happens to loan contract terms post-targeting. We find that banks charge a higher interest rate for loans made after the activist involvement compared to a matched sample of borrowers that were not targeted. However, we find that the initial stock price reaction to the announcement of an activist intervention is a strong predictor of post-target loan rates. Banks increase the loan rates for those targets that experience a strong positive stock price reaction. These findings suggest that banks adjust their loan pricing to reflect their concerns about wealth expropriation.

Private equity firms are accused by trade unions of changing industrial relations in buyouts by demonstrating an unwillingness to recognize and work with trade unions, and by downgrading information and consultation. To explore these important policy issues, this article reports the first representative pan-European survey of managers’ perceptions of the impact of private equity on industrial relations. Managers report that private equity investment does not result in changes to union recognition, membership density or changes in management attitudes to trade union membership. Furthermore, managers in firms recognizing unions after private equity buyouts do not report reductions in the terms and conditions subject to joint regulation. Under private equity ownership more firms report consultative committees, managers regard these as more influential on their decisions, and indicate increased consultation over firm performance and future plans. Comparing industrial relations changes in different social models in Europe, the results suggest private equity firms adapt to national systems and traditional national industrial relations differences persist after buyout.