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dc.contributor.authorDivakaruni, Anantha Krishna
dc.contributor.authorMeuleman, Miguel
dc.contributor.authorWright, Mike
dc.date.accessioned2017-12-02T14:53:17Z
dc.date.available2017-12-02T14:53:17Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12127/5231
dc.description.abstractPrevious studies have relied predominantly on agency theory to understand relationships among stakeholders (actors) involved in a leveraged buyout transaction and explain inherent characteristics of LBO debt financing. However, traditional agency theory overlooks structural characteristics like dependencies and power-differentials between principals and agents. Using a multiple-agency framework on a sample of 6,609 LBO loan tranches that were issued during the period 1986-2012, we examine how power dynamics impact contractual outcomes among LBO participants. Our analysis highlights the asymmetric nature of power among agency partners. Agency conflicts are lower when lenders (principals) have a dependence advantage over PE- sponsors (agents) and higher when the latter possess more power in the relationship.
dc.language.isoen
dc.subjectAccounting & Finance
dc.subjectEntrepreneurship
dc.subjectSmall and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs)
dc.titleThe paradox of stakeholder power in leveraged buyout financing: A multiple-agency perspective
vlerick.conferencedate07/08/2015-11/08/2015
vlerick.conferencelocationVancouver, Canada
vlerick.conferencename75th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management
vlerick.conferenceorganiserAcademy of Management
vlerick.knowledgedomainAccounting & Finance
vlerick.knowledgedomainEntrepreneurship
vlerick.typeconfpresConference Presentation
vlerick.vlerickdepartmentA&F
vlerick.vlerickdepartmentEGS
dc.identifier.vperid135138
dc.identifier.vperid58266
dc.identifier.vperid68189
dc.identifier.vpubid6480


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