The paradox of stakeholder power in leveraged buyout financing: A multiple-agency perspective
dc.contributor.author | Divakaruni, Anantha Krishna | |
dc.contributor.author | Meuleman, Miguel | |
dc.contributor.author | Wright, Mike | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-12-02T14:53:17Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-12-02T14:53:17Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12127/5231 | |
dc.description.abstract | Previous studies have relied predominantly on agency theory to understand relationships among stakeholders (actors) involved in a leveraged buyout transaction and explain inherent characteristics of LBO debt financing. However, traditional agency theory overlooks structural characteristics like dependencies and power-differentials between principals and agents. Using a multiple-agency framework on a sample of 6,609 LBO loan tranches that were issued during the period 1986-2012, we examine how power dynamics impact contractual outcomes among LBO participants. Our analysis highlights the asymmetric nature of power among agency partners. Agency conflicts are lower when lenders (principals) have a dependence advantage over PE- sponsors (agents) and higher when the latter possess more power in the relationship. | |
dc.language.iso | en | |
dc.subject | Accounting & Finance | |
dc.subject | Entrepreneurship | |
dc.subject | Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs) | |
dc.title | The paradox of stakeholder power in leveraged buyout financing: A multiple-agency perspective | |
vlerick.conferencedate | 07/08/2015-11/08/2015 | |
vlerick.conferencelocation | Vancouver, Canada | |
vlerick.conferencename | 75th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management | |
vlerick.conferenceorganiser | Academy of Management | |
vlerick.knowledgedomain | Accounting & Finance | |
vlerick.knowledgedomain | Entrepreneurship | |
vlerick.typeconfpres | Conference Presentation | |
vlerick.vlerickdepartment | A&F | |
vlerick.vlerickdepartment | EGS | |
dc.identifier.vperid | 135138 | |
dc.identifier.vperid | 58266 | |
dc.identifier.vperid | 68189 | |
dc.identifier.vpubid | 6480 |