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    Incentive contract design for projects: The owner's perspective

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    Publication type
    Vlerick strategic journal article
    Author
    Kerkhove, Louis-Philippe
    Vanhoucke, Mario
    Publication Year
    2016
    Journal
    Omega - International Journal of Management Science
    Publication Volume
    62
    Publication Issue
    July
    Publication Begin page
    93
    Publication End page
    114
    
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    Abstract
    Due to the adoption of more and more complex incentive contract structures for projects, designing the best contract for a specific situation has become an increasingly daunting task for project owners. Through the combination of findings from contracting literature with knowledge from the domain of project management, a quantitative model for the contract design problem is constructed. The contribution of this research is twofold. First of all, a comprehensive and quantitative methodology to analyse incentive contract design is introduced, based on an extensive review of the existing literature. Secondly, based on this methodology, computational experiments are carried out, which result in a set of managerial guidelines for incentive contract design. Our analysis shows that substantial improvements can often be attained by using contracts which include incentives for cost, duration as well as scope simultaneously. Moreover, nonlinear and piecewise linear formulae to calculate the incentive amounts are shown to improve both the performance and robustness across different projects.
    Keyword
    Incentives, Contracting, Project Management, Decision Making, Strategy
    Knowledge Domain/Industry
    Operations & Supply Chain Management
    DOI
    10.1016/j.omega.2015.09.002
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12127/5341
    ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
    10.1016/j.omega.2015.09.002
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