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dc.contributor.authorLuypaert, Mathieu
dc.contributor.authorVan Caneghem, Tom
dc.date.accessioned2017-12-02T15:00:26Z
dc.date.available2017-12-02T15:00:26Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/fima.12170
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12127/5716
dc.description.abstractWe examine the joint effect of bidder and target information asymmetry and uncertainty on the payment consideration and subsequent wealth effects in a large sample of acquisitions with both listed and private targets. In line with a risk-sharing argument, we find that acquisitions of targets characterized by higher uncertainty are more likely to be settled with stock. In contrast, higher target information asymmetry increases the likelihood of a cash payment, consistent with bidders strategically exploiting superior information. Acquirers of more opaque targets obtain a larger fraction of total acquisition gains and avoid sharing these gains with target shareholders by offering cash.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherJohn Wiley & Sons Ltd
dc.subjectAccounting & Finance
dc.subjectMergers & Acquisitions
dc.titleExploring the Double-Sided Effect of Information Asymmetry and Uncertainty in Mergers and Acquisitions
dc.identifier.journalFinancial Management
dc.source.volume46
dc.source.issue4
dc.source.beginpage873
dc.source.endpage917
vlerick.knowledgedomainAccounting & Finance
vlerick.typearticleVlerick strategic journal article
vlerick.vlerickdepartmentA&F
vlerick.vlerickdepartmentCMAB
dc.identifier.vperid132517
dc.identifier.vperid151526
dc.identifier.vpubid7023


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