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    Acquisitions in a patent contest model with large and small firms

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    Publication type
    Journal article
    Author
    Kleer, Robin
    Publication Year
    2009
    Journal
    Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
    Publication Volume
    9
    Publication Issue
    4
    Publication Begin page
    307
    Publication End page
    328
    
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    Abstract
    Big companies and small innovation factories possess different advantages in a patent contest. While large firms typically have better access to product markets, small firms often have a superior R&D efficiency. These distinct advantages immediately lead to the question of cooperations between firms. In this paper, we model a patent contest with heterogeneous firms. In a pre-contest acquisition game large firms bid sequentially for small firms to combine respective advantages. Sequential bidding allows the first large firms to bid strategically to induce a reaction of its competitor. For high efficiencies both large firms prefer to acquire immediately leading to a symmetric market structure. For low efficiencies strategic waiting of the first large firm leads to an asymmetric market structure even though the initial situation is symmetric. We also discuss two different timing setups of the acquisition stage. In all setups, acquisitions increase the chances for a successful innovation.
    Keyword
    Patent Contest, Acquisitions, Innovation, Strategic Waiting
    Knowledge Domain/Industry
    Innovation Management
    DOI
    10.1007/s10842-009-0055-4
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12127/5917
    ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
    10.1007/s10842-009-0055-4
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