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dc.contributor.authorDupire, Marion
dc.contributor.authorSlagmulder, Regine
dc.date.accessioned2018-09-28T11:32:24Z
dc.date.available2018-09-28T11:32:24Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.identifier.issn1544-6123
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.frl.2018.05.001
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12127/6016
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates how the risk governance practices of European financial institutions quantitatively cluster on the corporate governance characteristics of the corporation, particularly ownership structure and board independence. Using hand-collected data on a sample of 54 banks and 33 insurance companies, we find that financial institutions with powerful owners (i.e., those with >20% ownership) have a lower chief risk officer (CRO) presence and lower risk committee presence. In addition, state-controlled institutions and institutions with more independent boards have more independent risk committees.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.subjectRisk Governance
dc.subjectCorporate Governance
dc.subjectFinancial Institution
dc.subjectRisk Management
dc.titleRisk governance of financial institutions: The effect of ownership structure and board independence
dc.identifier.journalFinance Research Letters
dc.source.volume28
dc.source.issueMarch
dc.source.beginpage227
dc.source.endpage237
dc.contributor.departmentUniversity of Lille Nord de France
dc.contributor.departmentGhent University
vlerick.knowledgedomainAccounting & Finance
vlerick.typearticleJournal article with impact factor
vlerick.vlerickdepartmentAF
dc.identifier.vperid171492
dc.identifier.vperid39319


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