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dc.contributor.authorKeyaerts, Nico*
dc.contributor.authorMeeus, Leonardo*
dc.contributor.authorKeyaerts, Nico
dc.contributor.authorMeeus, Leonardo
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-10T16:09:26Z
dc.date.available2018-12-10T16:09:26Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.issn0957-1787
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jup.2017.04.005
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12127/6054
dc.description.abstractThere is a trend in regulatory practice towards providing dedicated incentives for strategic investments. Italy and the United States have the longest experience with authorizing returns and risk-mitigating incentives that deviate from standard regulatory treatment for policy purposes. In these countries, the regulatory incentives are based on a case-by-case assessment of capital projects. We find that the Italian scheme is simpler, which reduces administrative costs. The U.S. scheme is more advanced in the case-by-case assessment. Even though dedicated incentives may be controversial, our analysis of both experiences shows that, notwithstanding significant learning costs, both schemes have facilitated substantial financial investment in strategically important infrastructure.
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.subjectElectricity transmission
dc.subjectTransmission grid
dc.subjectInterconnection
dc.subjectIncentive regulation
dc.titleThe regulatory experience of Italy and the United States with dedicated incentives for strategic electricity transmission investment
dc.identifier.journalUtilities Policy
dc.source.volume46
dc.source.issueJune
dc.source.beginpage71
dc.source.endpage80
vlerick.knowledgedomainSpecial Industries : Energy
vlerick.typearticleJournal article with impact factor
vlerick.vlerickdepartmentEGS
dc.identifier.vperid174594
dc.identifier.vperid151626


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