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dc.contributor.authorSchittekatte, Tim
dc.contributor.authorMeeus, Leonardo
dc.date.accessioned2020-11-17T14:25:44Z
dc.date.available2020-11-17T14:25:44Z
dc.date.issued2020en_US
dc.identifier.issn0195-6574
dc.identifier.doi10.5547/01956574.41.5.tsch
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12127/6586
dc.description.abstractIn this paper a game-theoretical model with self-interest pursuing consumers is introduced in order to assess how to design a least-cost distribution tariff under two constraints that regulators typically face. The first constraint is related to difficulties regarding the implementation of cost-reflective tariffs. In practice, so-called cost-reflective tariffs are only a proxy for the actual cost driver(s) in distribution grids. The second constraint has to do with fairness. There is a fear that active consumers investing in distributed energy resources (DER) might benefit at the expense of passive consumers. We find that both constraints have a significant impact on the least-cost network tariff design, and the results depend on the state of the grid. If most of the grid investments still have to be made, passive and active consumers can both benefit from cost-reflective tariffs, while this is not the case for passive consumers if the costs are mostly sunk.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherIAEEen_US
dc.subjectBatteriesen_US
dc.subjectDistributed Energy Adoptionen_US
dc.subjectDistribution Network Tariff Designen_US
dc.subjectGame-theoryen_US
dc.subjectNon-cooperative Behaviouren_US
dc.titleLeast-cost distribution network tariff design in theory and practiceen_US
dc.identifier.journalThe Energy Journalen_US
dc.source.volume41en_US
dc.source.issue5en_US
dc.contributor.departmentFlorence School of Regulation, European University Institute, Italyen_US
dc.identifier.eissn1944-9089
vlerick.knowledgedomainSpecial Industries : Energyen_US
vlerick.typearticleVlerick strategic journal articleen_US
vlerick.vlerickdepartmentECen_US
dc.identifier.vperid153973en_US
dc.identifier.vperid151626en_US


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