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    Influence of acquirer boards on M&A value creation. Evidence from continental Europe

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    Publication type
    Journal article with impact factor
    Author
    Defrancq, Corneel
    Huyghebaert, Nancy
    Luypaert, Mathieu
    Publication Year
    2021
    Journal
    Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting
    Publication Volume
    32
    Publication Issue
    1
    Publication Begin page
    21
    Publication End page
    62
    
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    Abstract
    We examine how the size and the composition of acquirer boards are associated with shareholder abnormal returns for 2,230 M&As made by listed firms in Continental Europe. Although board size proves insignificant, our findings do offer some evidence as to a beneficial effect of board diversity on M&A value creation. Gender diversity appears marginally positively associated with acquirer shareholder abnormal returns. The fraction of foreign directors is in general not significantly positive, unless the rule of law in the acquirer country is weak. Nonetheless, nationality diversity in the board turns out harmful in purely domestic takeovers. The influence of age diversity is marginally positive, yet only in domestic and horizontal takeovers. Next, the fraction of independent directors has a robust positive effect on the acquirer CAR, while directors with multiple board appointments prove valuable especially through preventing firms from pursuing poor takeovers. Finally, CEO duality is detrimental only in industry‐diversifying deals initiated by acquirers that are not controlled by an individual or a family shareholder. Any negative CEO‐duality effect is mitigated when the acquirer‐country rule of law is strong.
    Keyword
    Board of Directors, Corporate Governance, Europe, Mergers and Acquisitions
    Knowledge Domain/Industry
    Accounting & Finance
    DOI
    10.1111/jifm.12124
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12127/6642
    ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
    10.1111/jifm.12124
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