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dc.contributor.authorWynant, Luc
dc.contributor.authorManigart, Sophie
dc.contributor.authorCollewaert, Veroniek
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-27T09:42:30Z
dc.date.available2022-07-27T09:42:30Z
dc.identifier.doi10.5465/AMBPP.2022.17580abstract
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12127/7067
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores how contracts in private equity-backed buyouts shape corporate governance in portfolio companies. Drawing upon agency theory and incomplete contracting theory, 34 actual contracts are analysed in detail. Contracts focus on reducing information asymmetries, mainly during the due diligence process, and aligning the goals of managers and PE investors during the investment period and at exit. Residual powers and contingencies are mainly used to deal with incomplete contract designs due to uncertainties. While some contractual mechanisms are comparable to those used in VC contracts, others are idiosyncratic to PE.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.subjectAOM Annual Meeting Proceedings 2022en_US
dc.subjectAOM Seattle 2022en_US
dc.titleHow private equity-backed buyout contracts shape corporate governanceen_US
dc.title.alternativeAcademy of Management Annual Meeting Proceedingsen_US
dc.contributor.departmentGhent University
dc.contributor.departmentKU Leuven
vlerick.conferencedate05/08/2022-09/08/2022en_US
vlerick.conferencelocationSeattle, Washington, United Statesen_US
vlerick.conferencename82nd Annual Meeting of the Academy of Managementen_US
vlerick.conferenceorganiserAcademy of Managementen_US
vlerick.knowledgedomainAccounting & Financeen_US
vlerick.knowledgedomainEntrepreneurshipen_US
vlerick.typeconfpresConference Proceedingen_US
vlerick.vlerickdepartmentAFen_US
vlerick.vlerickdepartmentEGSen_US
dc.identifier.vperid17738en_US
dc.identifier.vperid35884en_US
dc.identifier.vperid76153en_US


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