• Assessment of cost-benefit analysis for offshore electricity infrastructure development

      Bhagwat, Pradyumna; Schittekatte, Tim; Keyaerts, Nico; Meeus, Leonardo (2017)
      The application of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) for offshore electricity infrastructure projects with a pan-European impact is discussed. An analytical framework for the evaluation of CBA methodologies is presented. The framework is then applied to assess the CBAs of three offshore infrastructure projects (EWIC, COBRAcable and ISLES). Overall, the CBAs assessed already comply with several dimensions of the analytical framework. However, based on this assessment it is found that scope for improvement in quality exists in three areas namely, in considering project interactions, in dealing with uncertainty and in making the results between CBAs comparable by ensuring full monetisation. Furthermore, the research also confirms the view that a common harmonised CBA methodology is essential for selection of PCIs.
    • Decarbonizing the European electric power sector by 2050: A tale of three studies

      Delarue, Erik; Meeus, Leonardo; Belmans, Ronnie; D'haeseleer, William; Glachant, Jean-Michel (Florence School of Regulation, 2011)
    • DSO-TSO cooperation issues & solutions for distribution grid congestion management

      Hadush, Samson; Meeus, Leonardo (2017)
      The role of DSOs is evolving due to the increasing penetration of intermittent and distributed energy resources in the distribution system. On the one hand, TSOs are accessing flexibility resources connected to the distribution grid. On the other hand, DSOs are actively managing distribution grid congestion, moving away from the conventional fit and forget approach. As a result, the need for DSO-TSO cooperation has become increasingly important. In this study, we first discuss market and grid operation issues related to different system states and the corresponding congestion management approaches. Second, we discuss possible solutions that are inspired by inter-TSO cooperation solutions as well as solutions that are being adopted by DSOs. Our findings show that the issues are rather similar both at transmission and distribution level; however, the need for cooperation and the solutions will depend on where structural congestion will occur and which borders will be managed.
    • EU 2050 low-carbon energy future: visions and strategies

      Meeus, Leonardo; Azevedo, Isabel; Marcantonini, Claudio; Glachant, Jean-Michel; Hafner, Manfred (Florence School of Regulation, 2011)
      Other working paper not VBS
    • The future of DSOs. Our take on energy communities and regulatory sandboxes

      Meeus, Leonardo (2019)
      The energy transition is changing the energy ecosystem. Until recently, energy production was mostly centralised, with relatively few large power plants connected to the transmission system operated by transmission system operators (TSOs). Regulatory changes to accommodate the integration of renewable energy initially focused on the transmission aspect, which resulted in a significant transformation of the TSOs, while leaving the distribution system operator (DSO) landscape virtually unaffected. In recent years, however, due in part to advances in renewable energy technology, power generation and distribution have become more decentralised. DSOs now find themselves at the centre of change, operating the grid which all these new players – producers and prosumers – want to connect to and use. The challenge is for DSOs to enable and facilitate change, rather than becoming a bottleneck. In 2018 the DSO Chair organised two workshops to discuss topical issues facing the future of DSOs: (1) energy communities and (2) regulatory sandboxes. Despite being selected independently of each other, these two topics turned out to be interrelated.
    • Future-proof tariff design: Recovering sunk grid costs in a world where consumers are pushing back

      Schittekatte, Tim; Momber, Ilan; Meeus, Leonardo (2017)
      Traditional analysis of distribution grid user’s reaction to tariffs assumes a low price sensitivity and a lack of alternative technologies to grid connection. This is radically changing with two technology breakthroughs: (1) Photovoltaics (PV) enable domestic and commercial consumers to self-produce energy; (2) Batteries allow self-producers to set both their grid energy and capacity parameters. Contributing to the state of the art, the grid cost recovery problem is modelled as a non-cooperative game between consumers. In this game, the availability and costs of new technologies (such as PV and batteries) strategically interact with tariff structures. Four states of the world for user’s access to new technologies are distinguished and three tariff structures are evaluated. The assessed distribution network tariff structures are: energy volumetric charges with net-metering, energy volumetric charges for both injection and withdrawal, and capacity-based charges. Results show that the new distribution world -open by new technology choices for grid users- is highly interactive and threatens grid regulation not understanding it.
    • Mobilizing cities towards a low carbon future: tambourines, carrots and sticks

      Meeus, Leonardo; Delarue, Erik (Florence School of Regulation, 2011)
    • Modeling the cost of achieving a renewable energy target: does it pay to cooperate across borders?

      Saguan, Marcelo; Meeus, Leonardo (Florence School of Regulation, 2011)
    • Raising public awareness and trust in transmission infrastructure projects with incentive regulation: Tools and biases

      Bhagwat, Pradyumna; Keyaerts, Nico; Meeus, Leonardo (2018)
      Raising public awareness and trust in transmission infrastructure development is one of the key current challenges facing Transmission System Operators (TSOs) and other project developers. The result can be costly delays. Fine-tuning the regulatory toolbox that National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) apply to incentivise TSOs can be part of the solution. The toolbox consists of cost-plus or rate of return regulation, price or revenue cap regulation, and output regulation. Each of these tools has strengths and limitations in terms of biases. In this brief, we identify the biases that are specific to stakeholder engagement activities that TSOs undertake to increase the public awareness and trust. Under the cost-plus approach, NRAs are biased towards the least controversial activity. Thus, the TSOs will try to anticipate the costs that will be more easily approved by the regulator. However, these least controversial activities may not be the most effective. Under the price/revenue cap, TSOs can be biased towards prioritising activities that result in the highest direct improvement of cost efficiency. They can also be biased in selecting the least controversial activities rather than the most cost-effective ones, simply because it can adversely affect their reputation and their engagement with the regulator. Under output regulation, independent experts can help the regulator to assess and challenge the stakeholder engagement activities undertaken by a TSO. This approach, however, requires a higher level of sophistication and complexity so that it can only be managed properly by a regulatory agency with sufficient resources and skills.
    • Review of transmission tariff methods and practices in Europe

      Hadush, Samson Yemane; Buijs, P.; Belmans, Ronnie (2010)
    • Smart cities initiative: how to foster a quick transition towards local sustainable energy systems

      Meeus, Leonardo; Delarue, Erik; Azevedo, Isabel; Glachant, Jean-Michel; Leal, V.; de oliveira Fernandes, E. (Florence School of Regulation, 2010)
    • Smart regulation for smart grids

      Meeus, Leonardo; Saguan, Marcelo; Glachant, Jean-Michel; Belmans, Ronnie (Florence School of Regulation, 2010)
    • Spillover effects of distribution grid tariffs in the internal electricity market: An argument for harmonization?

      Govaerts, Niels; Bruninx, Kenneth; Le Cadre, H.; Meeus, Leonardo; Delarue, Erik (2019)
      In many countries, distribution grid tariffs are being reformed to adapt to the new realities of an electricity system with distributed energy resources. In Europe, legislative proposals have been made to harmonize these reforms across country borders. Many stakeholders have argued that distribution tariffs are a local affair, while the EU institutions argued that there can be spillovers to other countries, which could justify a more harmonized approach. In this paper, we quantify these spillovers with a simplified numerical example to give an order of magnitude. We look at different scenarios, and find that the spillovers can be both negative and positive. We also illustrate that the relative size of the countries is an important driver for the significance of the effects. To be able to quantify these effects, we developed a long-run market equilibrium model that captures the wholesale market effects of distribution grid tariffs. The problem is formulated as a non-cooperative game involving consumers, generating companies and distribution system operators in a stylized electricity market.