Steinel, WolfgangDe Dreu, Carsten K.W.Ouwehand, ElsjeRamírez-Marín, Jimena Y.2024-09-132024-09-1320090749-597810.1016/j.obhdp.2008.12.002http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12127/7534Although constituencies often consist of opposing factions, we know little about the way such opposing factions influence the representative’s negotiation strategy. This study addressed this issue: Representatives negotiated as sellers on behalf of a group consisting of hawkish (competitive) and dovish (cooperative) factions. Experiments 1–3 showed that a minority of hawks was sufficient to influence the representatives to acting in a competitive way; only when all constituents unanimously advocated a cooperative strategy were representatives more conciliatory towards their negotiation partner. These tendencies did not differ as a function of the representatives’ pro-social versus pro-self value orientation, or the unanimity versus majority rule putatively used in the constituency to accept of reject the representative’s negotiated agreement. We conclude that hawkish minorities are persuasive and influential because representatives accord more weight to hawkish than to dovish messages.enRepresentative NegotiationHomogeneous or Heterogeneous ConsistencyIntergroup NegotiationIntragroup ConflictSocial InfluenceDecision RulesSocial Value OrientationOrganizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes1095-9920319282