Govaerts, NielsBruninx, KennethLe Cadre, HélèneMeeus, LeonardoDelarue, Erik2021-02-252021-02-2520190140-988310.1016/j.eneco.2019.07.019http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12127/6654In many countries, distribution grid tariffs are being reformed to adapt to the new realities of an electricity system with distributed energy resources. In Europe, legislative proposals have been made to harmonize these reforms across country borders. Many stakeholders have argued that distribution tariffs are a local affair, while the European institutions argued that there can be spillovers to other countries, which could justify a more harmonized approach. In this paper, we quantify these spillovers in a simplified numerical example to give insight and an order of magnitude. We look at different scenarios, and find that the spillovers can be both negative and positive. To be able to quantify these effects, we developed a long-run market equilibrium model that captures the wholesale market effects of distribution grid tariffs. The problem is formulated as a non-cooperative game involving consumers, generating companies and distribution system operators in a stylized electricity market.enDistribution Grid Tariff DesignDistributed Energy ResourcesNon-cooperative GameEnergy PolicySpilloversEnergy Economics151626