Exploring social preferences in private-collection innovation
Garriga, Helena Aksuyek, Efe Hacklin, Fredrik von Krogh, Georg
Garriga, Helena
Aksuyek, Efe
Hacklin, Fredrik
von Krogh, Georg
Citations
Altmetric:
Publication Type
Journal article with impact factor
Editor
Supervisor
Publication Year
2012
Journal
Technology Analysis & Strategic Management
Book
Publication Volume
24
Publication Issue
2
Publication Begin page
113
Publication End page
127
Publication Number of pages
Collections
Abstract
Firms, research institutions and individuals have long realised the advantages of innovating in an open manner. Companies such as IBM, Philips and Procter & Gamble, increasingly seek to cooperate with outside individuals and organisations to tap into their ideas for new products and services. This approach makes good business sense, but it is also difficult to achieve. In particular, mechanisms that motivate innovators to ‘open up’ are critical in achieving the benefits of open innovation. Private–collective innovation (PCI) has become an increasingly important model for explaining innovation at the boundaries of traditional, closed and open innovation regimes. Previous work has examined PCI both conceptually and empirically, and recent scholarship has focused specifically on the initiation of PCI as it relates to problems of collective action. This work shows that a project will not ‘take off’ unless the right incentives are in place for innovators to contribute their knowledge to open innovation from the beginning. Drawing on behavioural game theory, this paper expands on prior work by exploring social preferences in the initiation of PCI. The authors conducted a simulation study that shows how inequality aversion, reciprocity and fairness affect the underlying conditions that lead to the initiation of PCI. The results indicate that reciprocity and the potential gains for other participants explain changes in individual knowledge sharing in PCI.
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Keywords
Knowledge-sharing, Game Theory, Private Collective Innovation