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    Government R&D subsidies as a signal for private investors

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    Publication type
    FT ranked journal article  
    Author
    Kleer, Robin
    Publication Year
    2010
    Journal
    Research Policy
    Publication Volume
    39
    Publication Issue
    10
    Publication Begin page
    1361
    Publication End page
    1374
    
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    Abstract
    Government subsidies for R&D are intended to promote projects with high returns to society but too little private returns to be beneficial for private investors. This may be caused by spillovers or a low appropriability rate. Apart from the direct funding of these projects, government grants may serve as a signal for good investments for private investors. We use a simple signaling model with different types of R&D projects to capture this phenomenon. The agency has a preference for basic research projects as they promise high expected social returns, while banks prefer applied research projects with high private returns. In a setup where the subsidy can only be used to distinguish between basic and applied research projects, government agency’s signal is not very helpful for banks. However, if the subsidy is accompanied by a quality signal, it can lead to increased or better selected private investments.
    Keyword
    Subsidies, Innovation, Asymmetric information, Signaling
    Knowledge Domain/Industry
    Innovation Management
    DOI
    10.1016/j.respol.2010.08.001
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12127/5916
    ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
    10.1016/j.respol.2010.08.001
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