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dc.contributor.authorWynant, Luc
dc.contributor.authorManigart, Sophie
dc.contributor.authorCollewaert, Veroniek
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-26T14:38:58Z
dc.date.available2022-07-26T14:38:58Z
dc.date.issued2023en_US
dc.identifier.issn1369-1066
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/13691066.2022.2109224
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12127/7066
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores how contracts in private equity-backed buyouts shape corporate governance in portfolio companies. Drawing upon agency theory and incomplete contracting theory, 34 actual contracts are analysed in detail. Contracts focus on reducing information asymmetries, mainly during the due diligence process, and aligning the goals of managers and PE investors during the investment period and at exit. Residual powers and contingencies are mainly used to deal with incomplete contract designs due to uncertainties. While some contractual mechanisms are comparable to those used in VC contracts, others are idiosyncratic to PE.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherRoutledge journals, Taylor & Francis Ltden_US
dc.subjectCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.titleHow private equity-backed buyout contracts shape corporate governanceen_US
dc.identifier.journalVenture Capitalen_US
dc.source.volume25
dc.source.issue2
dc.source.beginpage135
dc.source.endpage160
dc.identifier.eissn1464-5343
vlerick.knowledgedomainAccounting & Financeen_US
vlerick.knowledgedomainEntrepreneurshipen_US
vlerick.typearticleJournal article with impact factoren_US
vlerick.vlerickdepartmentAFen_US
vlerick.vlerickdepartmentEGSen_US
dc.identifier.vperid17738en_US
dc.identifier.vperid35884en_US
dc.identifier.vperid76153en_US


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